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Social stereotypes involve judgments of how typical certain personality traits are of a group. 
According to the attribution hypothesis, judgments of trait typicality depend on the perceived 
prevalence of the trait in the target group. According to the categorization hypothesis, such 
judgments depend on the degree to which a trait is thought to be more or less prevalent in the 
target group than in a relevant comparison group. A study conducted with women and men 
as target groups showed that the attribution hypothesis fi t the data best when typicality ratings 
were made in an absolute format. When, however, typicality ratings were made in a comparative 
format (how typical is the trait of women as compared with men?), both hypotheses received 
support. Analytical derivation, supported by empirical evidence, showed an inverse relationship 
between the size of perceived group differences and their weight given in stereotyping. 
Implications for stereotype measurement and the rationality of social perception are discussed.
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from the same domain, and the ability to 
make comparative judgments requires some 
Human judgment, be it psychophysical or social, 
occurs in absolute and comparative modes. In 
the absolute mode, a judge directly assesses the 
properties of an object and maps them on an 
existing scale. In the comparative mode, a judge 
evaluates a target object in relation to another 
object, which provides a standard for com-
parison. Neither one of these modes is entirely 
pure. The ability to make absolute judgments 
requires past experience with other objects 
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sense of how each object—the target and the 
referent—is alike.
The dialectic between absolute and compar-
ative modes of judgment pervades many areas 
of social perception, including the study of 
social stereotypes. Social stereotypes are often 
assessed by having people rate how typical 
or characteristic various traits are of a target 
group. By one account, people only care about 
the prevalence of a trait in the group. The more 
prevalent it is, the more typical it must be. 
This hypothesis assumes a simple associative 
mechanism linking typicality judgments to 
prevalence estimates. We refer to this idea as 
the attribution hypothesis. By another account, 
people also care about prevalence of a trait in 
a comparison group. The larger—and the more 
positive—the difference in trait prevalence 
is, the more typical the trait must be. This 
hypothesis assumes a more complex psycho-
logical mechanism. Two prevalence estimates 
must be generated and compared before trait 
typicality can be judged. We refer to this account 
as the categorization hypothesis.
Both hypotheses have a long history. Zawadski 
(1948) and Allport (1954) recognized their 
theoretical appeal, but did not express a pre-
ference. Empirical work initially favored the 
associationism embodied by the attribution 
hypothesis (e.g., Brigham, 1971; Mann, 1967), 
but later emphasized the idea that stereotypes 
involve perceptual differentiations between 
groups (e.g., Ford & Stangor, 1992; Judd & 
Park, 1993; Martell & DeSmet, 2001; McCauley 
& Stitt, 1978). The way stereotypes were meas-
ured yielded corresponding defi nitions of what 
stereotypes were. Both types of defi nition can 
be found in the literature. Refl ecting the at-
tribution point of view, Hilton and von Hippel 
(1996) defi ne stereotypes as ‘beliefs about the 
characteristics, attributes, and behaviors of 
members of certain groups’ (p. 240). Applying 
this perspective to gender stereotypes, Eagly, 
Mladinic, and Otto (1991) suggest that ‘the 
percentage of people in each group (e.g., 
women) who have each characteristic (e.g., who 
are “warm”) [captures the] association between 
the group and each characteristic’ (p. 208). 
Conversely, Kunda and Thagard (1996) take the 
categorization view, suggesting that any ‘stereo-
type is noteworthy only inasmuch as it implies 
that members of the stereotyped group differ 
signifi cantly from ordinary people’ (p. 297). With 
regard to gender, Chiu and colleagues suggest 
that ‘knowledge about gender differences [is] 
organized into a network in a person’s long-
term memory’ (Chiu, Hong, Lam, Fu, Tong, & 
Lee, 1998, p. 82).
The coexistence of divergent defi nitions and 
measurement approaches presents a challenge: 
how should a suitable defi nition be chosen 
among the available alternatives, and does it 
really matter? One option is to ask which defi n-
ition is most consistent with the way people 
form judgments about social groups. Another 
option is to ask how empirical judgments map 
onto the underlying processes that give rise to 
these judgments. The appeal of the attribution 
hypothesis is its simplicity. This hypothesis 
assumes that people only need to learn and 
remember frequency information (Hasher & 
Zacks, 1984) and to transform this information 
into probabilistic prevalence estimates (Estes, 
1976). These tasks require little attention and 
can yield high levels of accuracy (Anderson & 
Schooler, 1991), and this may explain why 
stereotypes are easily activated (Lambert, Payne, 
Jacoby, Shaffer, Chasteen, & Khan, 2003). In 
contrast, the categorization hypothesis requires 
the learning of probability differentials or the 
covariation between categories and features 
(Lewicki, Hill, & Czyzewska, 1992). This type 
of learning can also occur, but it is more easily 
disrupted (Stamos-Rossnagel, 2001).
Competitive hypothesis tests are complicated 
by the fact that the predictions are the same 
much of the time. Consider the perception 
that 60% and 40% of people in groups A and B 
respectively possess a certain trait. Both hypoth-
eses predict that the trait will be seen as typical 
of group A and atypical of group B. Across 
traits, it can be expected that typicality ratings 
are correlated with both the simple prevalence 
estimates for the target group (e.g., A) and with 
the differences between the two prevalence 
estimates (e.g., A-B).
Tests of the attribution and the categorization 
hypotheses require assessments of their unique 
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effects. The unique attribution effect is given by 
the correlation between typicality ratings and 
prevalence estimates for the target group that 
control for the differences in the prevalence 
estimates for the two groups. The unique cat-
egorization effect is given by the correlation 
between typicality ratings and the differences 
between the two sets of prevalence estimates 
that control for the prevalence estimates for the 
target group. In a study of national stereotypes, 
American and Italian participants made pre-
valence estimates and typicality ratings for 
Americans, Italians, English, and Germans. Each 
of the four stereotypes was characterized by a 
strong unique attribution effect, whereas the 
unique categorization effects were negligible 
(Krueger, 1996). The superior fi t of the attribu-
tion hypothesis was replicated in a study of 
gender stereotypes using American and Italian 
judges (Krueger, Hasman, Acevedo, & Villano, 
2003).
Although suggestive, the evidence in favor of 
the attribution hypothesis has not been decisive 
(Kanahara, 2006). There are three possible 
reasons why the categorization hypothesis 
remains viable: one is conceptual, another is quan-
titative, and a third is a matter of research design. 
Consider all three in the context of gender 
stereotypes: the conceptual reason is that gender 
stereotypes, roles, and identities are inherently 
interrelated rather than isolated (Gawronski, 
Bodenhausen, & Banse, 2005; Goldstone, 1996). 
What it means to be male presupposes some idea 
of what it means to be female, and vice versa. 
The conceptual feature of gender stereotypes 
inevitably forms a background to all research 
on gender perception.
The quantitative reason is that when true 
differences between groups are small, the per-
ceptions of these differences are often exag-
gerations (Krueger & DiDonato, 2008). Most 
gender-related differences are rather small 
(Hyde, 2005), while gender stereotypes suggest 
numerous perceived differences (Allen, 1995; 
Diekman, Eagly, & Kulesa, 2002; Martin, 1987; 
Rosenkrantz, Vogel, Bee, & Broverman, 1968; 
Spence & Buckner, 2000; but see also Swim, 
1994). The accentuation of gender differences 
refl ects a basic principle of categorical reasoning 
(Eiser, 1996; Krueger, 1992; Krueger & Clement, 
1994; Rothbart, Davis-Stitt, & Hill, 1997). Dif-
ferences between categories are exaggerated 
when a salient categorical (i.e., social grouping) 
variable is correlated with the continuous (i.e., 
psycho-behavioral) variable being judged (Tajfel, 
1969; Wyer, Sadler, & Judd, 2002).
If people perceived no gender differences at 
all, the categorization hypothesis would have to 
be false. If, however, people do perceive group 
differences, they have an opportunity to base 
their judgments of trait typicality on these dif-
ferences. By extension, one might conclude that 
the larger these perceived differences are, the 
more strongly they are associated with judgments 
of trait typicality. The meta-contrast principle 
of self-categorization theory suggests as much 
(Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994). In contrast, 
the earlier study on national stereotypes yielded 
evidence suggesting that the inverse was true: 
categorization effects—to the degree that they 
occurred at all—were associated with smaller 
perceived group differences (Krueger, 1996). 
In the present study, we sought to replicate 
this fi nding empirically, and to explicate it 
analytically.
The third reason for the potential viability of 
the categorization hypothesis has to do with the 
way judgments of trait typicality are elicited. 
In earlier studies that tested the attribution 
hypothesis and the categorization hypothesis, 
participants made typicality judgments in an 
absolute format (e.g., ‘how typical is the trait 
of sensitivity of women?’). Instructions did not 
refer to relevant comparison groups. No such 
reference is necessary from the perspective of 
the attribution hypothesis, which assumes that 
people automatically look up their own pre-
valence estimates for the trait, and proceed to 
make correspondingly high or low typicality 
ratings. Typicality ratings may, as Schneider 
(2004, p. 50) suspected, ‘simply be another 
way of asking what percentage of a group has a 
particular feature’. According to the categoriz-
ation hypothesis, however, reference to a com-
parison group may be critical for people to 
compute differential prevalence estimates. Such 
computations may be stimulated by instructions 
that explicitly call for comparative typicality 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(3)
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ratings (e.g., ‘how typical is the trait of sensitivity 
of women compared with men?’). This idea fi ts 
with self-categorization theory, which assumes 
that stereotyping increases inasmuch as inter-
group comparisons are salient.
Explicit instructions may be necessary 
if comparative thinking is more effortful and 
resource-dependent than associative thinking 
(Dawes, 2001). People may be perfectly able to 
make comparative judgments, but they may not 
feel compelled to do so when presented with 
absolute rating formats. Their reliance on non-
comparative associations may be a satisfactory 
response in light of conversational norms that 
require experimental instructions to be infor-
mative but not overly detailed (Grice, 1975; 
Schwarz, 1998).
The main goal of the present research was to 
revisit the relative strength of the attribution 
and the categorization hypotheses by using both 
absolute and comparative response formats. If 
the strength of the attribution hypothesis in 
past research refl ected the operation of asso-
ciative and automatic reasoning, evidence for 
this hypothesis should also be strong when 
instructions call for comparative typicality 
ratings. If, however, comparative thinking can 
be stimulated by proper instructions, the cat-
egorization hypothesis should be supported 
under the appropriate response format.
Comparative ratings have been used in re-
search on gender stereotypes (Hall & Carter, 
1999; Spence & Buckner, 2000), and one particu-
larly interesting study employed both formats. 
After fi nding that some perceptions of gender 
differences were weak, or even reversed, when 
ratings were absolute, Diekman and Eagly 
(2000) suggested that absolute ratings induce 
participants to hold each gender to a different 
standard. An agentic trait, such as assertiveness, 
may seem equally characteristic of women and 
men even when women exhibit fewer assertive 
behaviors. Comparative ratings might overcome 
such effects of ‘shifting standards’ (Biernat & 
Manis, 1994). Consistent with this possibility, 
perceptions of gender differences reappeared 
in Diekman and Eagly’s fourth study when par-
ticipants judged gender differences with regard 
to the target attributes (2000).
Hypotheses
The fi rst hypothesis was that the evidence for the 
attribution hypothesis would be stronger than the 
evidence for the categorization hypothesis when 
typicality ratings are made in an absolute format. 
Evidence for the categorization hypothesis would 
emerge when typicality ratings are made in a 
comparative format. Specifi cally, an increase in 
the categorization effect should occur because 
participants more strongly base their typicality 
ratings on their percentage estimates for the 
opposite gender, rather than reducing their 
reliance on their percentage estimates for the 
target gender.
The second hypothesis was that participants 
would strongly differentiate between the two 
genders. We expected the correlation be-
tween the percentage estimates made for the 
two genders to be low or even negative. The 
critical question regarding intergroup differ-
entiation was how it might be related to the 
strength of the categorization effect. Recall 
that, according to one view, the perception of 
larger group differences should be associated 
with a greater use of these perceived differences 
in the construction of trait typicality ratings. 
According to empirical precedent, however, 
the opposite may be true (Krueger, 1996). We 
addressed this issue both analytically and 
empirically: analytically, we decomposed the 
mathematical formula for a difference-score 
correlation (Cohen & Cohen, 1983) and asked 
how changes in the individual elements of this 
formula would affect the categorization effect as 
a whole. Empirically, we asked the same question 
using multiple regression analyses to examine the 
role of individual differences in the constituents 
of the difference-score correlation.
Method
Participants
Brown University undergraduates participated 
(N = 195, mean age of 19.5 years). Some received 
course credit, whereas others were recruited 
from around the campus as volunteers. The 
data of 11 participants were discarded for being 
either incomplete or without variance (thus 
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precluding the computation of correlation 
coeffi cients). The fi nal sample consisted of 109 
women and 75 men.
Procedure
Participants were presented with a list of 12 
personality-descriptive terms from the short 
version of Bem’s Sex Role Inventory (BSRI: 
Bem, 1981). The list of 12 traits was compiled 
using the results of a reliability analysis, which 
was performed on the full list of 10 feminine, 
10 masculine, and 10 gender-neutral traits 
(Krueger et al., 2003). Using the data set from 
that previous study (N = 86), we found that 
among the feminine traits, the four highest 
corrected item-total correlations were obtained 
for the adjectives sensitive (.78), soothing (.84), 
tender (.76), and warm (.81). Of the masculine 
traits, the adjectives assertive (.69), dominant 
(.68), risk-taking (.59), and taking a stand (.65) 
were the most reliable, and of the gender-neutral 
traits, the adjectives helpful (.69), likeable (.54), 
reliable (.60), and sincere (.65) were the most 
reliable.
Participants generated three responses for 
each trait item: they estimated the percentage 
of women who could be described by the trait, 
the percentage of men who could be described 
by the trait, and how typical the trait was of 
one of the gender groups. About half the par-
ticipants made the typicality ratings in an 
absolute format, whereas the other half made 
these ratings in a comparative format, rating 
‘women, compared with men’, or rating ‘men, 
compared with women’. Typicality ratings could 
range from 1 (not typical at all) to 9 (very typical). 
The order of the three sets of ratings was varied 
across participants. After completing the ques-
tionnaires, participants were debriefed.
Results
Typicality at the mean level
Before addressing the hypotheses regarding 
the size of the attribution and categorization 
effects, we examined average typicality ratings 
for the two target groups. We needed to establish 
that ratings reflected the expected pattern 
of gender-typedness, and to ask whether the 
response format moderated this basic pattern. 
To meet these goals, we submitted each of the 
three sets of traits to a multivariate analysis of vari-
ance (MANOVA), in which the format of the scale 
(absolute vs. comparative) and the gender of the 
target group were the independent variables, 
and the ratings of the four traits belonging to 
a given gender type were the dependent vari-
ables. As expected, feminine traits were rated as 
more typical of women (M = 6.46) than of men 
(M = 3.99) (F(4, 183) = 50.80, p < .001), whereas 
masculine traits were rated as less typical of 
women (M = 4.57) than of men (M = 6.83) 
(F(4, 183) = 50.78, p < .001). Gender-neutral traits 
were rated as being somewhat more typical 
of women (M = 5.96) than of men (M = 5.12) 
(F(4, 183) = 12.26, p <.001). Univariate analyses 
replicated these fi ndings for each of the 12 trait 
items. No other effects were signifi cant.
These preliminary null fi ndings suggest that 
the use of a comparative response format by itself 
did not increase perceived gender differences. 
By the lights of self-categorization theory, one 
could have expected that a comparative format 
increases the salience of social categorization and 
thereby the perceptual differentiation between 
groups. The lack of an effect of rating format on 
typicality ratings was further supported by the 
fi ndings that average typicality ratings obtained 
with the two formats were highly correlated 
(r = .99 and .97, respectively, for the female 
and male target groups).
Attribution versus categorization
Our fi rst hypothesis was that the attribution 
effect would be larger than the categorization 
effect when typicality ratings were absolute. This 
difference should be reduced or reversed when 
these ratings were comparative. To repeat, the 
unique attribution effect was captured by the 
average idiographic correlation between trait 
prevalence estimates for the target group and 
trait typicality ratings for that group, with the 
differences between prevalence estimates for 
the two groups being controlled.1 The unique 
categorization effect was captured by the cor-
relation between the differences in prevalence 
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estimates and trait typicality ratings, with the 
prevalence estimates for the target group being 
controlled.
In a 2 (format: absolute vs. comparative) × 2 
(participant gender) × 2 (target gender) × 2 
(measure: attribution vs. categorization) mixed-
model ANOVA with repeated measures on the 
last variable, the effect of format was statistically 
signifi cant (F(1, 180) = 4.55, p = .034), and so was 
the predicted interaction between the type of 
format and the type of measure (F(1, 180) = 5.50, 
p = .02) (all other Fs < 1). Consistent with our 
fi rst hypothesis, the attribution effect was more 
than twice as large as the categorization effect 
when ratings were absolute (see Figure 1, left 
panel) (F(1, 88) = 11.93, p = .001, d = .38). When 
compared against the null hypothesis of zero, 
the categorization effect remained signifi cant, 
although it was small (t(90) = 4.77, p < .001).
The expected re-emergence of the categor-
ization effect was also observed: as shown in 
the right panel of Figure 1, the categorization 
effect was as strong as the attribution effect 
when participants made comparative typicality 
ratings. Simple effects analyses showed that, com-
pared with the effects obtained with absolute 
typicality ratings, the categorization effect was 
stronger (F(1, 180) = 3.82, p = .052, d = .29), and 
the attribution effect was weaker (F(1, 180) = 5.74, 
p = .018, d = .35).
According to a strict version of our hypo-
thesis, there should have been only an increase 
in the categorization effect, but not a decrease 
in the attribution effect. To explore the reasons 
for the equivalence of the two effects in the 
comparative condition, we examined the zero-
order correlations between prevalence estimates 
and typicality ratings. We designated the cor-
relation between estimates for the target gender 
and typicality ratings for the target gender 
r(Pt,T) and the correlation between estimates 
for the opposite gender and typicality ratings 
for the target gender r(Po,T). A 2 (format) × 2 
(typicality ratings for women vs. men) × 2 
(percentage estimates for women vs. men) 
mixed-model ANOVA with repeated measures 
on the last variable yielded a signifi cant three-
way interaction (F(1, 180) = 4.65, p =.032).2 
Examination of this interaction suggested that 
instructions to make comparative rather than 
absolute typicality ratings produced a tend-
ency to associate prevalence estimates for the 
Figure 1. Trait typicality as predicted by prevalence estimates and difference scores: Z-scored partial 
correlations (with standard error bars).
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opposite gender more strongly—and more 
negatively—with typicality ratings for the target 
gender (M = –.45 vs. –.39), (F < 1, d =.10), and 
to associate estimates for the target gender less 
strongly with these typicality ratings (M = .71 
vs. 78), (F(1, 180) = 3.63, p = .058, d = .28). This 
pattern is weak evidence for the categorization 
hypothesis, which assumes that only the fi rst 
would be signifi cant.
Perception of group differences
Our second hypothesis was that participants 
would perceive strong gender differences. The 
correlations between prevalence estimates for the 
two genders, r(Pt,Po), were indeed negative and 
of virtually the same size as the effect observed 
in previous research (Krueger et al., 2003). The 
lack of any difference between the conditions 
using a comparative (M = –.30) and an absolute 
rating format (M = –.32) was consistent with 
our preliminary analyses of typicality ratings, 
which had suggested that a change in the rating 
format per se does not strengthen perceptions 
of group differences.
The critical question was whether differences 
in the size of the accentuation effect would pre-
dict the strength of the categorization effect. 
Consider fi rst the analytical approach to this 
question. Recall that the simple attribution 
effect (i.e., prior to partialing the categoriza-
tion effect) is the correlation between prevalence 
estimates for the target gender and typicality 
ratings, r(Pt,T). This zero-order correlation 
should be the only predictor of the attribu-
tion effect. In contrast, the simple categoriza-
tion effect is the correlation between typicality 
ratings and the differences between estimates for 
the target gender and estimates for the opposite 
gender. A difference-score correlation can be 
recovered from the three underlying zero-order 
correlations and the three variances (Cohen & 
Cohen, 1983, p. 416). In the present case, 
r
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This formula allows one to appreciate how the 
categorization effect would change if any of the 
constituent correlations were to change. First, 
confi rming the idea that the simple categor-
ization effect is naturally confounded with the 
simple attribution effect, it is evident that the 
difference-score correlation increases as r(Pt,T) 
becomes more positive. Second, confi rming 
the idea that the categorization effect captures 
the contrast between target group and opposite 
group, the difference-score correlation increases 
as r(Po,T) becomes more negative. Third, the 
analytical approach confi rms an earlier claim 
that larger perceived group differences are asso-
ciated with smaller categorization effects. The 
difference-score correlation becomes larger as 
r(Pt,Po) becomes less negative.
Applying the analytical approach to the 
unique attribution and categorization effects, 
we fi nd that the attribution effect increases as 
r(Pt,T) becomes larger and as r(Po,T) becomes 
less negative, while accentuation, r(Pt,Po), has 
little effect.3 The categorization effect (formula 
not shown) increases as r(Po,T) becomes more 
negative and as r(Pt,Po) becomes less negative. 
Here, changes in r(Pt,T) have little effect. In 
short, both stereotyping effects respond to 
changes in two of the three underlying zero-
order correlations (see Table 1). Note that the 
correlation between prevalence estimates for the 
opposite gender and typicality ratings is the only 
one that affects both effects, and that it does so 
in opposite ways. From this, it follows that the 
two partial correlations are inversely related. As 
the unique categorization effect increases, the 
unique attribution effect decreases.
The analytical patterns, which were obtained 
under the ceteris paribus assumption, can serve 
as baseline hypotheses for the exploration of 
empirical data. We performed regression an-
alyses across participants, which allowed us to 
detect how associations specifi c to the target 
gender, r(Pt,T), associations specific to the 
opposite gender, r(Po,T), and intergroup ac-
centuation effects, r(Pt,Po), contribute to the 
attribution effect and to the categorization effect 
in stereotype judgments. Because the fi ndings 
were similar regardless of the gender of the 
participants, the gender of the target group, 
and the instructional set, we considered only 
analyses across all participants. First we regressed 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(3)
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the unique attribution effect on the three zero-
order correlations. As expected, the size of the 
unique attribution effect increased as r(Pt,T) 
became more positive (β = .65, p < .001), and as 
r(Po,T) became less negative (β = .62, p < .001). 
The degree of accentuation, r(Pt, Po), did not 
play a role (β = 0). We then regressed the unique 
categorization effect on the same predictor 
variables. Again, as expected, the categorization 
effect increased as r(Po,T) became more negative 
(β = –.88, p < .001), and as r(Pt, Po) became less 
negative (β = .53, p < .001). Changes in r(Pt,T) 
played no role (β = .01). These fi ndings are also 
summarized in Table 1. 
The fi nal analytic prediction was that the 
strength of the attribution effect would be 
negatively related to the strength of the cat-
egorization effect. The data showed that this 
was the case: r(182) = –.49, p < .001. In sum, 
the analytical derivations provided a good fi t 
for the empirical data.
Robustness of results
Regarding the robustness of the fi ndings, four 
points are worth noting. First, the difference 
scores can be recovered from ratios: a b a
b
a
− = −( ), 







1  Computer simula-
tions show that these transformations have 
little impact on correlational analyses (Krueger 
et al., 2003). No differences emerged in a past 
study using both methods (Krueger, 1996), 
nor did a re-analysis of the present data reveal 
any. Second, the correlational analyses were 
idiographic (i.e., within participants and across 
items) rather than nomothetic (within items 
and across participants). Theoretically (Kenny 
& Winquist, 2001) and empirically (Robbins & 
Krueger, 2005), these two approaches are 
equivalent. A re-analysis of the present data 
confi rmed this. Third, the unique effects of 
attribution and categorization were assessed by 
partial correlations. Partial regression weights 
should—and did—yield similar results. We 
retained the partial correlation approach to 
preserve comparability of the present data with 
past research. Fourth, treating participants as 
the units of analysis and computing all pair-
wise correlations across traits, we found that 
typicality ratings were more reliable in the com-
parative format (M = .59) than in the absolute 
format (M = .48), and that difference scores were 
more reliable (M = .59) than their constituent 
prevalence estimates (M = .46). These fi ndings 
(sem < .02) contravene the idea that the relatively 
modest size of the categorization effect resulted 
from the unreliability of its measurement.
Discussion
Judd, Park, Yzerbyt, Gordijn, and Muller (2005, 
p. 678) asserted that ‘all beliefs about social 
groups are comparative’. Such strong claims 
regarding the power of the categorization effect 
may have to be reconsidered. The present study 
confi rmed previous fi ndings which suggested 
that when people rate how typical a trait is of a 
target group, their judgments can be modeled 
by the attribution hypothesis. Probabilistic esti-
mates of trait prevalence in the target group 
predict typicality judgments well, whereas 
estimates for a comparison group are virtually 
irrelevant. We speculated that the failure of the 
categorization hypothesis could stem, in part, 
from typicality judgments being cast as absolute 
rather than comparative judgments. When the 




Correlation Prediction β Weight Prediction β Weight
r(Pt,T) + .65 0 .01
r(Po,T) + .62 – –.88
r(Pt,Po) 0 0 + .53
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instructions for typicality judgments matched 
the categorization hypothesis by explicitly 
calling attention to the comparison group, the 
categorization hypothesis contributed as much 
to the modeling of stereotype judgments as the 
attribution hypothesis did.
Taken together, these fi ndings suggest that 
stereotype judgments are both parsimonious and 
sensitive to the logic of conversation. Being more 
laborious than associative thinking, comparative 
thinking is not engaged unless it is specifi cally 
elicited. Surprisingly, participants achieved 
the equal strength of the attribution and the 
categorization effect not exclusively through an 
increase in the categorization effect, but partly 
through a reduction in the attribution effect. 
Instead of merely giving greater weight to their 
prevalence estimates for the opposite gender, 
they also gave less weight to their estimates for 
the target gender.
The present fi ndings fi t well into a larger 
emerging theme. The validity of comparative 
self-judgments, for example ‘how happy am I 
compared with the average person?’, was long 
taken for granted until componential analyses 
showed that people heavily rely on absolute 
self-judgments and virtually ignore their own 
absolute judgments of the average person 
(Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; Moore & Small, 
2008). This associationist pattern arises in 
part from egocentric weighting of self-referent 
information, and in part from attention being 
focused on the self. Our fi ndings show that a 
focalist bias can emerge when self-judgments 
play no role.
Research on implicit prejudice also tends to 
conceptualize and measure biases against certain 
social groups in comparative terms. The popular 
implicit association test (Greenwald, McGhee, 
& Schwartz, 1998) yields an index of bias that is 
a difference between two differences (Krueger, 
2008). For example, reaction times elicited 
from White participants show how rapidly they 
associate White stimuli with positive stimuli, 
White stimuli with negative stimuli, Black stimuli 
with positive stimuli, and Black stimuli with 
negative stimuli. Blanton, Jaccard, Gonzales, and 
Christie (2006) found that only the last type of 
association predicted participants’ scores on a 
self-report measure of prejudice.
The other major result of this study was that 
although participants perceived women and 
men differently, the degree to which they did 
so was negatively related to the strength of the 
categorization effect. In other words, a stronger 
accentuation effect was associated with a 
weaker categorization effect. This fi nding may 
be intuitively surprising and at variance with the 
meta-contrast principle of self-categorization 
theory. Yet this confl ict is easily resolved. Recall 
that our analysis was focused on the unique 
effects of the three zero-order correlations. This 
strategy of exploring unique effects paralleled 
our approach to the analysis of unconfounded 
attribution and categorization effects. Statistically, 
however, the three correlations systematically 
constrain one another. If r(Pt,T) and r(Po,T) are 
respectively positive and negative, it is likely that 
r(Pt,Po) is negative. Without controlling r(Pt,T) 
and r(Po,T), it will thus appear that stronger 
inter-group accentuation effects are associated 
with stronger categorization effects.
Rationality
We now consider a theoretical and a meth-
odological implication of the present research. 
The theoretical implication is concerned with 
the rationality of social judgment. In its pure 
form, the categorization hypothesis exemplifi es 
the ideal of rational judgment, which is the 
construction of a belief system that is free from 
internal contradictions (Dawes, 2001). Such 
coherence can be attained if typicality ratings for 
a target group are equally related, though with 
different signs, to prevalence estimates for the 
target group and to prevalence estimates for the 
comparison group. If this standard is achieved, 
the difference-score representing the cat-
egorization effect is maximized, and judgments of 
typicality amount to judgments of diagnosticity: 
they allow the categorization of a person into 
a social group on the basis of a known at-
tribute. Statistically, such coherence means that 
prevalence estimates for both groups tap into the 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(3)
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same underlying construct (i.e., diagnosticity), 
which legitimates the use of difference scores 
(Blanton et al., 2006).
As the correlation between prevalence estimates 
for the opposite gender and typicality ratings 
for the target gender becomes less extreme, the 
difference-score correlation becomes smaller. 
Statistically, the difference score becomes con-
founded because it integrates variables that 
measure different constructs ( Johns, 1981). 
Ultimately, the unique categorization effect 
disappears. If, for example, the correlation 
between prevalence estimates for the target 
gender and typicality ratings is .5 and the cor-
relation between prevalence estimates for the 
opposite gender and typicality is 0, the difference-
score correlation is still positive, but the unique 
categorization effect is nil.
The empirical fragility of the categorization 
effect marks a diffi culty inherent in comparative 
ratings. Unlike absolute ratings, which can be 
made on the basis of simple associations, com-
parative ratings require the kind of effortful 
cogitation that is characteristic of rational 
judgment. The distinction between associative 
processes underlying the attribution effect and 
refl ective, comparative processes underlying the 
categorization effect evokes distinctions made by 
two-systems theories of social judgment (Strack & 
Deutsch, 2004).4 In many areas of social life, the 
associative systems yield judgments of reasonable 
accuracy without consuming precious mental 
resources (Gigerenzer, 2006; Willis & Todorov, 
2006). When social stereotyping is understood as 
such an ordinary form of heuristic reasoning, its 
adaptive benefi ts can be documented (Macrae, 
Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994).
Item selection
The methodological implication of this work is 
concerned with the types of group character-
istics chosen for the study of stereotyping. In 
many areas of social judgment research, trait-
descriptive adjectives are the common grist for 
the data-analytic mill. Usually, trait adjectives are 
selected for their ability to capture individual 
and group differences. Consider three different 
types of trait: one type consists of features that 
all (or no) members of all groups share, such as 
being mortal; another type consists of features 
that all members of one group share, but no 
member of the other, such as having two X 
chromosomes; yet another consists of features 
that some members of one group share, but 
all members or no member of the other share, 
such as having a caesarian section.
Traits of the fi rst type (e.g., mortality) do not 
involve variation across individuals or groups, 
and thus yield no insights into processes of 
attribution or categorization. Traits of the second 
type (e.g., having two X chromosomes) perfectly 
confound attribution with categorization, and 
thus offer no statistical leverage for competitive 
hypothesis testing. Traits of the third type are 
more intriguing. According to the attribution 
hypothesis, having had a caesarian is not typical 
of women because most have had none. Accord-
ing to the categorization hypothesis, having had 
a caesarian is highly typical of women because it 
yields a positive difference score. If only items of 
this type were presented, or if statistical analyses 
were nomothetic (i.e., for a single item), the 
attribution and categorization effects would 
be perfectly confounded. All difference scores 
would be equal to the prevalence estimates for 
the target group, and hypothesis tests would be 
reduced to investigators’ intuitive judgments of 
whether mean typicality rating for such items 
can be considered high or low. The constraints 
imposed by certain types of judgment item 
suggest that it is reasonable to use personality-
descriptive terms for stereotype assessment. 
Such items permit both individual and group 
differences across the entire percentage scale.
Conclusion
The idea that one core function of social stereo-
types is to simplify social perception has enjoyed 
broad acceptance since the days of Lippmann 
(1922) and Allport (1954). The present research 
suggests that people rely on simple associations 
between trait prevalence and trait typicality as 
a default when constructing mental images of 
groups. When prompted, however, they can also 
call upon perceived group differences to con-
struct more complex images. We believe that 
the empirical strength of the attribution effect 
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may not only be a matter of mental parsimony 
and resource conservation. As we noted at the 
outset, all trait judgments involve implicit com-
parisons. Inasmuch as social stereotypes are not 
mere conglomerations of unrelated attributes, 
prevalence estimates for a set of traits within 
the same group tend to cohere into a theme 
or Gestalt (Rehder & Hastie, 2001; Wittenbrink, 
Gist, & Hilton, 1997). As people perceive inter-
item correlations within a group, judgments 
about any trait serve as cues for other traits. 
Here lies a fi nal advantage of parsimony: it is 
easier to infer that trait Y has a high prevalence 
in the group if the prevalence of trait X is also 
high, than it is to infer that trait Y positively 
differentiates group A from group B if this is 
what trait X does.
Notes
1. Correlations involving difference scores and 
a female target gender were multiplied with 
–1 so that they could be aggregated with the 
corresponding correlations involving the male 
target gender.
2. Participant gender was not included in this 
analysis.
3. The partial correlation representing 
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p. 177), and the term r(T,Pt– Po) can be 
expressed by the standard formula for 
difference score correlations.
4. Eiser (2003) recently presented a connectionist 
model and computer simulations to argue that 
inter-group comparisons and accentuation can 
arise from a set of associations being made 
unconsciously and in parallel—that is, without 
the burden of added effort.
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